Category: General

• Rewatching both B5 and SG: Atlantis. Whilst I enjoy Atlantis, it just doesn't compare. The show never goes anywhere, plot or character-wise. #
• My vision with the new glasses is just like I've turned on high resolution textures in the first person shooter that is my life. #
• Today I test the social media system that will be the new PHIL105. #
• Backing up all my documents to the cloud. #
• First day with glasses: eyes not as tired as they usually are. Hardly anyone noticed them, or, if they did, thought I already wore glasses. #
• Second successful bread-making experience in a row. Huzzah. #
• Used my "celebrity" to great advantage tonight. Will not be told otherwise. #
• The first day of glasses was "Wow." The second day of glasses was "Hmm…" Today: "These things are heavy." #
• The Aotearoa conspiracy theories map – updated: http://bit.ly/bPlKHP #
• Hello world #ogb #
• Seated and ready for the collaboration. Where my communist homies at? #ogb #
• Some people are just too distracted by the egg. #ogb #
• Schrodinger. The cat with the golden paws. #ogb #
• I'll show you a huge fan. #ogb #
• Stephen Colbert makes a literary appearance. Well done, that man. #ogb #
• Plato's Cave. The three philosophers release the cheering. #ogb #
• Tweeting like a boy with a new toy tonight. Will I regret it in the morning? #ogb #
• Sushi swallowing contest: 17 seconds. #ogb #
• Home from the social event of the season. Fun had by some (and if you know your existential qualifiers, "some" can entail "all"). #ogb #
• #WIKIFACT If you put infinite monkeys in a room with infinite typewriters, you may experience difficulties selling your house. (via @WFv2) #
• Finally getting used to staring at one thing for a long time in these here glasses. Now to get back to work. #
• Is "Rubicon" going to turn out to be "Alias?" The secret agency who really works for someone else. #
• Imperator Fish: A Map Of The Right In New Zealand http://goo.gl/b/FOh6 (via @ImperatorFish) #

• First successful loaf from the breadmaker in months. This is such good news that I had to tweet it. #
• Dear Bronagh Key: dare you to wear pants. (via @LewisStoddart) #
• The Billionaires Bankrolling the Tea Party – NYTimes.com http://tumblr.com/xquh4hohc #
• Hmm, it seems that rumouring about rumours pays well. Thanks, Singapore. #
• It's not official yet, but my keratoconus (http://bit.ly/c54mpt) seems to be advancing significantly. What ho, eventual corneal graft! #
• In a good news/bad news kind of thing, it seems my eyes aren't degenerating too badly; I just have a lack of focus. #
• I told you defining things wouldn't work out: http://bit.ly/aHsZZB #
• Well, I'm glad I bought in that washing. #
• The Glenn Beck Conspiracy Theory Generator http://tumblr.com/xquhhnozu #
• The Glenn Beck Conspiracy Theory Generator | Clipmarks http://bit.ly/aYDX5I (via @DrvTimeHappyHr) #
• Yes, I do engage in internet dating, although profiles like this will scare me away: http://yfrog.com/5d8dap #
• In case it's not clear, the logo on the t-shirt says "White Pride World Wide." Gah. http://yfrog.com/0kow4sp #

• The problem with writing a blogpost on reasonable disagreement is that I'm now reasonably disagreeing with the material I write yesterday. #
• It's lucky I have no cash on my person; Mr. Whippy is outside and I'm tempted to stop being a vegan for some fat-based ice cream treats. #
• Conspiracy Theory. Isnt it time for a NEW name? – I agree with some of the sentiment expressed in this post,… http://tumblr.com/xqugdzq6k #
• Kitchen flooding… Gah. That wasted a large chunk of the afternoon, and it wasn't even my fault. #
• "Quantum physicists might choose to emphasis parts of the evidence when they present explanations at parties, social events or Bar Mitzvahs #
• Loved the last "Sherlock" until you know who appeared. Gatiss doesn't get what made that character so interesting; the anonymity. #
• Tweeting from the tutorial. All the cool kids do it these days. #
• I need an ice block. #
• Perhaps I might skip "Media 7" tonight; my body is refusing to work with me today. #
• Influx of sugar into my system might repair me. #
• I quite like "Rubicon" but I have no idea what it's about. #
• Watching the second to last ever episode of "Better Off Ted." Why did the world let this show die? #
• We just reached 2000 signatures on the Toonstruck Two petition! Sign it at http://www.petitionspot.com/petitions/toonstrucktwo #
• Updated version of the local conspiracy theories map: https://www.mrxdentith.com/allembracing/allembracing/the-aotearoa-conspiracy-theory-map-wip/ #
• I have spent too much time on the map today. This way leads to paranoia. #
• Those last two tweets are comedy gold and do not reflect my actual opinions. #
• Somedays can only be solved by an application of hot chips to the stomach area. #
• I keep wondering when "Rubicon" is set. #
• Need flowchart/diagramming software to do the update conspiracy theory map? Suggestions? Needs to run on OS X. #
• "The blades slice across the glass, but they don't cut the blizzard of raindrops exploding ahead of me…" Wishart: http://bit.ly/aGWveu #
• Playing around with Omnigraffle to remake the map, but I don't like how I have to use a set canvas size. That's just awkward. #

In the comedic narrative that is Life, the Universe and Everything (which is not a reference, at this time to the book by Douglas Adams), sometimes two things feed into each other. Today’s example is the topic of reasonable disagreement; something the internet tries to force me to engage in far too much.

It seems trivial to say that we (seem to) reasonably disagree on a lot of issues. We often disagree with acquaintances on matters of politicks and religion, monetary policy and pop cultural phenomena. I know people whose opinion I respect who are on the Right, and we seem to be able to agree to disagree on matters to do with, say, whether Rodney Hide is a disingenuous fool (although secretly one of us thinks that we’re right (or mostly right) whilst the other is dead wrong). Philosophers of Religion, in particular, disagree all the time when it comes to whether or not god (or the gods) exist, and, ontologically speaking, either the atheist or the theist philosopher is going to be in the right. Either the gods exist, or they don’t, even if it turns out that we have no good arguments for such propositions.

Now, some reasonable disagreement occurs because we often have different evidence and start out from different assumptions, and thus we reason, it seems rationally, to different conclusions. For example, If one detective only has the fingerprint evidence for some crime, evidence that points towards Bob the Builder committing the crime, and the other detective only has the eye-witness testimony, evidence that indicates Postman Pat as the culprit, then they should come to very different conclusions as to who committed the crime.

However, if the detectives were to share their evidence and talk through how it should be weighted (so as to come to a common starting point for their reasoning based upon the evidence), presumably they should both reason to the same conclusion. The idea, in its simplest form, is that, given the same evidence, rational agents should come to the same conclusions (this is called the Uniqueness Thesis or TUT: TUT: For any total body of evidence, there is exactly one reasonable attitude to take towards some proposition) ((I’m not entirely convinced that TUT is true, but that is a matter for another time.)). If the detectives fully disclose and share all of their evidence, then, if they are rational, then they should come to complete agreement as to who stole the Fat Controller’s blood diamonds.

Certain philosophers think that it isn’t possible for there to be reasonable disagreement between two rational aegents after full disclosure. No matter where you start your reasoning from, as long as you share all of your evidence, then there is one and only one justified position for you to take. To disagree in such circumstances is to act irrationally.

Now, this seems like a problem, because people, like philosophers (who are people too), do seem to reasonably disagree on a lot of matters, like the existence of the gods, whether the concepts mentioned in our best theories in the Sciences actually exist and whether there is any merit to interpreting the works of Nietzsche as philosophy. In the Philosophy of Religion, for example, atheist philosophers often know all the theistic arguments for the existence of god (or the gods) and know that the theists know and have replied to the atheistic arguments and yet these same philosophers still seem to engage in reasonable disagreement on the subject of the existence of some divine agent.

I’ve been asked by a colleague in my Department ((I’m beginning to get a complex about capitalising “Department;” it sounds like I work for some amorphous arm of the government and not for a group of people who squabble like children at staff meetings. Then again, I suspect the members of amorphous arms of the government squabble like children at their meetings as well.)) whether there is reasonable disagreement thesis when it comes to conspiracy theories. Now, on one level, I’m not sure that it does; I don’t think we can point to many, if any, reasonable disagreements about the plausibility of certain conspiracy theories. Whilst there is disagreement between, for example, those who hold that 9/11 was an Inside Job and those who claim it was an Outside Job, there isn’t, as far as I can see, people who go “I respect your viewpoint; let’s just agree to disagree, eh?” ((There is, I suspect, some reasonable-esque disagreement in the “Inside Job” community; a lot of fellow travellers who agree that the American government committed the acts of September 11th, 2001, disagree as to how it was committed, but when such disagreements are highlighted they tend to fracture such groups as opposed to glossing over them; the disagreement is only reasonable, it seems, if people don’t talk through it.))

Now, there might be a class of people who do not have a decided opinion on such matters as to whether 9/11 was an Inside or Outside job, and such people, when they hear the rival arguments, might say “I don’t know what to believe about this; those people seem to disagree so I’ll suspend judgement on the matter for the time being.” What, we might ask, are these people actually doing? Are they being rational?

Presumably, if they don’t know the epistemic status of the authorities in disagreement, then they are being rational. If you see two strangers disagreeing and you know nothing about the thing they are disagreeing over, then it would be irrational to side with either party to the debate. However, if you are in the position to judge who is a legitimate authority, presumably you could gauge who holds the burden of proof and decide accordingly.

Still, there might be reasonable disagreement between philosophers about the rationality of conspiracy theories. Brian L. Keeley thinks that, by and large, we are justified in dismissing conspiracy theories out of hand and Charles Pigden thinks such a dismissal is unwarranted; they seem to know each other’s arguments and yet disagree (relatively) ((I also worry that I am a) over using parentheses and b) not using them correctly.)) reasonably. Of course, given that I’m writing my thesis on the subject I think they are both right and in error, so what might I know?

I don’t really have an answer to any of this; I’m just ruminating in textual form to try and get some sense of the shape of reasonable disagreement with regards to conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorising. If I have any further thoughts, I’ll be sure to let you know.

Comments appreciated.