Tag: Papers

More on that Palmerston North paper…

The AAP paper is motivated by three questions we can ask about rival explanations when it comes to Conspiracy and non-Conspiracy Theories:

1. To what extent is the explanation conspiratorial?
2. What are the explanation’s epistemic credentials?
3. What is the explanation’s institutional status?

I’m trying to give an argument as to why the average 1930s Moscovite should have (or had good reason to have) believed the official stories ((This is no longer my terminology in the paper, but that’s probably another post.)) of the Moscow Show Trials and Lysenkoism.

One way to argue that is with reference to how we construe a legitimate Appeal to Authority; academic theories, for example, are usually only endorsed if they have the right credentials, but we don’t necessarily think that is the case with political theories. Sometimes, as we both know, politicians endorse theories because the populace wants them to, or they are mistaken, misguided et cetera.

My two examples, however, are clear cases of duplicitous political endorsement, so, really, what I need (and I think this is a clever bit) a fourth question:

Was the explanation postulated sincerely?

Now, because we think that insincere endorsements of unwarranted theories are rare, we have a prima facie case for thinking that we should, at least on first glance, accept the Official Story when it is up against a Conspiracy Theory.

It gets more complex than that, of course, in the six thousand words, but I think this, as the gist, kind of works

Official Stories vs. Conspiracy Theories

Hello, new readers.

Well, I’m hoping there are new readers; I’ve had some record highs for hits the last few days and it would be nice if some of you stayed on and continued to read. At some point over the weekend I’m going to present a digest of some of the e-mails I received in response to the Herald on Sunday article, but today I thought I might talk about the latest part of the thesis, a paper I am presenting at the AAPNZ ((Australasian Association of Philosophy, New Zealand Branch.)) 2009 conference in Palmerston North.

Title: The Role of Endorsement in Conspiracy and non-Conspiracy Theories

Abstract: One of the arguments that belief in Conspiracy Theories is irrational stems from a common preference for what might be called “Official Theories,” “Official Stories” or the “Received View.”  Official Theories, in an ideal world, would be theories with good epistemic credentials endorsed by some appropriate set of authorities. However, some Official Theories are supported by a mere appeal to political authorities. Any Conspiracy Theorist worth their salt will tell you that theories that are only supported in this way should be treated with suspicion. The mere fact that someone is in power does not imply that they are an epistemic authority. If, in some cases, an Official Theory is backed up solely by an appeal to a political authority, should we prefer it over a Conspiracy Theory? I say “Yes,” but with caveats.

The paper is my attempt to explain why Moscovites were reasonable in their preference for the Official Stories of the Moscow Show Trials and Lysenkoism in the 1930s, despite the fact that both these events were examples of the Soviet Government conspiring against its citizens. It is a paper in Social Epistemology, I suppose; I am arguing that the endorsement of an explanation by some relevant authority (its having institutional status) suggests that the explanation has epistemic credentials, even though it is not entailed.

To sort through the issue I ask three questions:

1. To what extent is the explanation conspiratorial?

2. What are the explanation’s epistemic credentials?

3. What is its institutional status?

Which gives me a range of different theories, from Mere (no epistemic credentials) Sneer (negative institutional status) Conspiracy Theories to Warranted (the right epistemic credentials) Endorsed (positive institutional status) Theories. What I’m primarily interested in are when Mere Endorsed Theories seem to trump Conspiracy Theories; why is it that it seems reasonable for a 1930s citizen of Moscow to accept the official line on the Moscow Trials and ignore the findings of the Dewey Commission?

As I get closer to presenting I should, hopefully ((I know, I’ve made promises like this before.)) have more to say on this.

Prepping the slideshow for the Skeptics Conference

Well, today I fly down to Wellington for the Skeptics Conference, to deliver my paper ‘The Slippery Slope of Conspiracy Theories.’ Here’s a short five minute video about it. I’ll report back about the paper’s success (or lack thereof) soon.

Rejection once more

Well, the paper on Rumours and Conspiracy Theories has got its second rejection from the journal and, like last time, I received a largely positive review (it features a few points I’m going to take note of; not so much criticisms but things that could feature as footnotes) and a negative review (which was nowhere near as cutting as the last negative review). Normal practice at this point is to repackage the blighter and send if off to another journal, but I do want to have a quick look over it… And the last time I did a quick look over the paper I spent five days on it; don’t have time for that at the moment. I’m a wee bit behind on the current chapter and it needs to be finished.

In related news. one of the reasons why I’m so behind on work is the film festival occurring here in Auckland; eleven films watched so far and two more to go.

Which isn’t the best of excuses for not doing work but, then again, it’s an excuse and I’m sticking by it.

Revised! Resubmitted! Rumoured!

I’m behind on so many things that you might as well call me Mr. Matthew Behind. For example, I have failed entirely to tell you of the resubmission of ‘Rumour Has It,’ the Rumour-cum-Conspiracy Theories paper I wrote for the 2006 AAP which was then reworked and submitted to a journal and received both a glowing and glowering review (from two reviewers, luckily). I worked up my changes and submitted them, although due to some e-mail related ‘mistake’ the revised version has only just reached the editor’s desk.

The rewrite was, I think. a success; the paper is all the better for it. The really, really, really negative review was hard to reconcile with the immensely positive one and I ended up following the positive review’s suggested changes and amendments because the negative one described the paper as unsalvageable.

‘Have You Heard: Rumours and Conspiracy Theories’ has now become ‘Have You Heard: The Reliable Rumour.’ It’s less about Conspiracy Theories now; it focuses on the rather novel thesis that Rumours are examples of normally warranted beliefs and that the pejorative notion of Rumour really refers to the process of Rumour-mongering.

It will hopefully be available in a library near you at some point in the future. Otherwise, if all else fails, the blog (although it would have to fail at a lot of journals before that became a live option ((There is probably a link, auto-magically generated) at the end of this post to some version of the talk you can ‘engage’ with now…))).

Resent

So, the Kaikoura Piece is off to a new journal. Now that I’ve had a bit of time to cogitate over the comments I got back on the revision I’ve come to another in my series of `Epiphanies to do with my thesis topic,’ a succession of disheartened realisations that very few people actually think that Conspiracy Theories are even vaguely worth philosophical consideration.

It’s sad, really, that the overwhelmingly pejorative sense of `Conspiracy Theory’ has become the normal term. Conspiracy Theories are beliefs about the world, purported explanations of an event that cite a Conspiracy as its salient cause…

I could go on, but as that last sentence really should be going into my definitional chapter I might take the opportunity to develop the thesis further. So, back to the coal mine for me. I will, however, explain the why and the really really why of why the response seems so academically perverse soon.